Foreword--Privacy and Secrecy after September 11 by Rotenberg, Marc
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2002
Foreword--Privacy and Secrecy after September 11
Marc Rotenberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rotenberg, Marc, "Foreword--Privacy and Secrecy after September 11" (2002). Minnesota Law Review. 1873.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1873
Foreword
Privacy and Secrecy After September 11
Marc Rotenbergt
It is difficult to speak about privacy in the United States
today without considering the significance of September 11.
That day has had a profound impact on the public perception of
privacy, the actions of Congress, the development of new tech-
nologies, and most likely even the decisions of courts. Polls in-
dicate increased public support for new forms of surveillance.1
Congress has moved swiftly to expand the surveillance author-
ity of the state.2 New technologically advanced means of sur-
veillance, such as biometric identifiers and a National ID card,
t Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Former Counsel, Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee (Senator Patrick Leahy). Thanks to Mikal J. Condon
for research assistance, and to Matthew Wegner and the Minnesota Law Re-
view for organizing this symposium. Thanks also to Professor Paul Schwartz
for his encouragement and Professor Daniel Solove for his dedication.
1. See, e.g., ABC News/Washington Post Terrorist Attack Poll #3, ABC
NEWS/WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2001 (indicating high levels of public support for
expanded government surveillance, use of wiretap authority, and ID cards in
the wake of the September 11 attacks); Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Jonathon Krim,
A Changing America: National ID Cards Gaining Support, WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 2001, at Al (indicating nearly 70% support for some form of National ID).
But see E-Government Poll, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2002, at A21 (finding that
Americans are sharply divided on the issue of national ID cards, with only
47% in support of a national ID, and 44% viewing it as "an invasion of people's
civil liberties and privacy"); ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RESEARCH, Bureau
of Justice Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1994) (illustrating long-
standing public opposition (by three to one) to use of electronic surveillance as
an acceptable investigative technique).
2. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1654 (2001); Defense Appropriations Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002); Departments of Commerce, Jus-
tice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001); Uniting And Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 15 Stat. 272 (2001).
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are now under serious consideration.3 Even the courts have
shown a new deference to claims of national security.4
During such periods in history it is appropriate to reexam-
ine core values and consider the structure and purpose of prin-
ciples in law that today are constantly under attack. This is
only partly to reaffirm critical political goals; it is also to ex-
plore and clarify the relationship and significance of critical
concepts that are too easily misunderstood.
In this Article I will examine two critical concepts in the
world of privacy-privacy and secrecy-and discuss what the
developments since September 11 tell us about the relationship
between these two key legal categories. I will argue that they
are very different ideas, reflecting very different political val-
ues, and that they are fundamentally at odds in the structure
of privacy law in the United States. But it is fair to note at the
outset that the terms are often used interchangeably. We
speak of meeting "in secret" and meeting "in private." We com-
municate secretly and we communicate privately. There are
aspects of our lives that we wish to keep secret, or private.
These terms require more careful examination, particularly af-
ter the events of September 11.
I. DIMINISHMENT OF PRIVACY BY LEGAL MEANS
One clear impact of September 11 has been the reduction
in privacy protection under U.S. law. The USA PATRIOT Act
is the most sweeping expansion of government surveillance au-
thority since the passage of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994.5 Where CALEA estab-
lished for the first time the premise that the government had
the authority to require by law that new communication ser-
vices be designed to enable surveillance by the state, the USA
Patriot Act limited in multiple ways the scope, impact, and ef-
fect of many privacy laws previously in force in the United
States.
3. See Barnaby J. Feder, A Surge in Demand to Use Biometrics, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at C21, available at http'J/www.nytimes.com/2001/12/17/
technology/17IRIS.html; O'Harrow & Krim, supra note 1, at Al.
4. See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001) (up-
holding the use of the Classified Information Procedures Act in a case involv-
ing a low-level mobster).
5. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(1995)).
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To understand the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act on
privacy law in the United States you must understand that the
protection of privacy by statutory means typically incorporates
a wide range of Fourth Amendment values, such as an articu-
lated probable cause standard, a notification requirement, a
nexus between the authority granted and the area searched,
and means of judicial oversight.6 Taken separately and as a
whole, these provisions limit the state's ability to conduct
searches, thereby seeking to safeguard certain aspects of pri-
vate life that may be recorded in paper or electronic records.
Broadly stated, these provisions develop from two lines of
cases that provide the twin cornerstones for information pri-
vacy law in the United States. The first is the Olmstead v.
United States and Katz v. United States line, which gave way to
enactment of the federal wiretap act in 1968.7 The second is the
United States v. Millers and California Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultz9 line, which led Congress to recognize that if there were
to be constitutional safeguards for the disclosure of personal in-
formation to police held by third parties, Congressional action
would be required.10
6. The law enforcement provision in the Subscriber Privacy provision in
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the Cable Act) provides a good
example:
Except as provided in subsection (c)(2)(D) of this section, a govern-
mental entity may obtain personally identifiable information concern-
ing a cable subscriber pursuant to a court order only if, in the court
proceeding relevant to such court order-
(1) such entity offers clear and convincing evidence that the subject of
the information is reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activ-
ity and that the information sought would be material evidence in the
case; and
(2) the subject of the information is afforded the opportunity to appear
and contest such entity's claim.
Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
551(h) (2002)).
7. Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (1994)); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
9. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
10. The Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (2002). See also Right to Financial
Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
3401 (1994)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-
508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
(1994)); Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-2000aa-12 (1994)).
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Since the mid-1970s a range of privacy laws in the United
States has been enacted to limit government access to a wide
range of record systems, including government records, finan-
cial records, medical records, cable subscriber records, elec-
tronic mail records, video rental records, and more.11 In just the
last few years, Congress extended new safeguards to medical
information, 12 financial information, 13 and records on stu-
dents. 14
The USA PATRIOT Act did not destroy the edifice of U.S.
privacy law, but it did significantly weaken the structure and
limit the coverage of many key statutes. The Act limits safe-
guards created by fifteen statutes. 15 It reduces probable cause
standards in key laws. 16 It significantly expands the authority
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It limits judicial
review. 17 It creates a new "sneak and peak provision" for police
to undertake searches without the customary notification re-
quirement.'8
Still, the USA PATRIOT Act is not the only means by
which privacy provisions in the United States have been dimin-
ished since September 11. The Attorney General has also indi-
cated that attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest privileges
11. See supra note 10; see also Video Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. 100-
618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711
(2000)); Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act (FERPA), Pub. L. No. 93-
380, 88 Stat. 571 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
12. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in various provisions
in 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
13. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999).
14. Elementary and Secondary Education Act Authorization Bill,
Pub. L. No. 107-110 § 1061, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
15. Among the statutes amended by the USA PATRIOT Act are The Right
to Financial Privacy, 12 U.S.C. § 3414; Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681u; The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Addi-
tional Grounds for Issuing Warrant under Title II, 18 U.S.C. §3103; ECPA, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2511, 2516, 2517, 2520, 2702, 2703, 2707, 2709, 2711, 3056,
3121, 3124, 3127; FERPA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g, 9007; The Cable Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 551; The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803,
1804, 1805, 1806, 1823, 1824, 1842, 1843, 1861-1863 (1994 & Supp. 1998). See
generally USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 15 Stat. 272 (various provi-
sions amending language in each of the aforementioned statutes).
16. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.107-56, §§ 206, 216, 218, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
17. Id. §§ 206-208, 214-215, 218, 225.
18. Id. § 213.
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in common law, may be violated by police. 19 And proposals cur-
rently pending in Congress would enable access by state police
to records previously restricted under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.20
Apparently the only area that the Attorney General be-
lieves should not be subject to reduced protection following Sep-
tember 11 are the records provided by individuals seeking the
right to carry personal firearms. There the Attorney General
has said that, because there is no current legal authority, in-
vestigators seeking access to this information should be re-
stricted. 21 The Attorney General had not made a similar argu-
ment during the debate over the USA PATRIOT Act with
regard to the information that might be sought in telephone re-
cords, banking records, voicemail records, educational records,
library records, or business records.
II. LOSS OF PRIVACY BY TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS
The expansion of state surveillance authority under the
USA PATRIOT Act is only one way that personal privacy has
been diminished after September 11. The government has also
sought by technical means to expand monitoring and profiling
of individuals. At the moment, the three proposals that have
received the most attention are a National ID Card, new face
recognition technology, and systems for border control .
A. NATIONAL ID CARD
The proposal for the National ID Card reflects, perhaps
more than any other example, the great ambivalence of the
American people about the appropriate response to the events
of September 11. In the days following that event, public opin-
19. See U.S. Bureau of Prisons Special Administrative Measure for the
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062 (2001) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 500-501).
20. See Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act of 2001, S.
1615, 107th Cong. (2001).
21. Peter Slevin, Ashcroft Blocks FBI Access to Gun Records; Critics Call
Attorney General's Decision Contradictory in Light of Terror Probe Tactics,
WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2001, at A26.
22. See, e.g., E-Government Poll, supra note 1, at A21; Bill Miller, Ridge to
Brief Senators About Border Security; Session Conflicts With Byrd Hearing,
WASH. POST, May 2, 2002, at A2; O'Harrow & Krim, supra note 1, at Al;
Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Facial Recognition System Considered for U.S. Airports,
Reagan National May Get Scanning Device, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2001, at
A14.
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ion polls showed sharp increases for support of a National ID.23
Prominent American businessmen, law professors, and political
leaders also expressed support for the idea.24 A congressional
hearing in the late fall suggested that a National ID Card, de-
fined as one issued by the federal government that individuals
in the United States would be required to carry, would still face
strong political opposition.25 Technical experts also noted the
significant privacy and security risks in the development of a
true National ID.26 And subsequent polls indicated that the ini-
tial wave of support for a National ID Card had diminished.27
Thereafter, the focus shifted to a proposal put forward by the
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
(AAMVA) to build upon the current state-issued drivers license
and to create a document that was both more secure, by means
23. See Harris Poll, Overwhelming Public Support for Increasing Surveil-
lance Powers and, Despite Concerns about Potential Abuse, Confidence that the
Powers Will be Used Properly, at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/
allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=370 (Oct. 3, 2001) (indicating that 68 % of the
public polled supports national identification cards).
24. Elise Ackerman & Paul Rogers, ID Card Idea Attracts High-level Sup-
port: Top executives, lawmakers back national identification card proposal,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 16, 2001, at 1A; Alan M. Dershowitz, Why
Fear National ID Cards?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at A23; Press Release,
Senator Feinstein Identifies Weaknesses of U.S. Visa System, Oct. 12, 2001,
http'J/ feinstein.senate.gov/releasesOl/s-visas.htm.
25. See Oversight Hearing on "National Identification Card" Before the
Subcomm. on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Rep. Horn, Chairman, House
Comm. on Gov't Reform); see also O'Harrow & Krim, supra note 1, at Al
("[T]he political hurdles to a national ID card remain huge. President Bush
has publicly downplayed their benefits, saying they're unnecessary to improve
security. Bush's new cyberspace security chief, Richard Clarke, recently said
he does 'not think it's a very smart idea."').
26. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 25, (statement of Ben Schneider-
man, Professor of Computer Science, University of Maryland) ("We must ask
whether there is now a secure data base that consists of 300 million individual
records that can be accessed in real time? The government agencies which
come close are the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Admini-
stration, neither or which are capable of maintaining a network that is widely
accessible and responsive to voluminous queries on a 24 hour by 7 days a week
basis."); Peter G. Neumann and Lauren Weinstein, Risks of National Identity
Cards, 44 COMM. OF THE ACM 176 (2001); Bruce Schneier, National ID Cards,
CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSLETTER, at http'//www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-
0112.html#1 (Dec. 15, 2001);.
27. See Donna Leinwand, National ID in Development, But Enthusiasm
for the System Appears to be Fading, Poll Says, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at
2A; Julia Scheeres, Support for ID Cards Waning, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 13,
2002, at http'//www.wired.com/news/business/0,136,51000, O0.html.
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of a biometric identifier, and more easily integrated with a va-
riety of record systems.2 At present, it remains unclear
whether the AAMVA proposal to create a de facto National ID
Card will go forward. There are both legislative and budgetary
obstacles, and Americans still appear deeply divided.29
B. FACE RECOGNITION
A second proposal to significantly expand surveillance is
the idea of putting in place new "smart cameras" that have the
ability to match in realtime the images of individuals viewed in
public and private places against a stored database of facial
images, which could be either those of suspected terrorists, li-
censed drivers, gamblers in Las Vegas casinos, or children in
the Washington, DC public school system.30 Joseph Attick,
CEO of the company Visionics, has argued that his system for
face recognition would reduce the risk of terrorist threat, and
several pilot projects are underway.31 However, independent
studies have also raised questions about the reliability of face
recognition systems, and at least one airport has decided not to
go forward with the system after the chief of security deter-
mined that it might actually diminish the effectiveness of cur-
28. See AM. ASS'N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINS., SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON
IDENTIFICATION SECURITY REPORT TO THE AAMVA BOARD, at
http://www.aamva.orgtdocuments/private/idsecuritytaskforce/drvidsecuritytas
kforcerecommendations.pdf (Jan. 2002); see also Robert O'Harrow Jr., States
Devising Plan for High-Tech National Identification Cards, WASH. POsT, Nov.
3, 2001, at A10.
29. See E-Government Poll, supra note 1, at A21; EPIC, Your Papers,
Please: From the State Drivers License to a National Identification System, at
http'//www.epic.org/privacy/idLcards/yourpapersplease.pdf (opposing the
AAMVA plan); Shane Ham & Robert D. Atkinson, Progressive Policy Institute
Report: Modernizing the State Identification System, at http'/
www.ppionline.org/documents/Smart_Ids_ Feb._02.pdf (Feb. 7, 2002).
30. See Robert O'Harrow Jr., Facial Recognition System Considered for
U.S. Airports, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at A14; Robert O'Harrow Jr., D.C.
Plans ID Card for Students; Aim of DMV Database is Missing Children,
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2001, at Al; Bob Hirschfeld, Security is Watching,
TECH TV, at http://www.techtv.com/news/culturelstory/0,24195,336-
7924,00.html (Jan. 11, 2002).
31. See Karen Alexander, Airport to Get Facial Recognition Technology
Oakland, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at B1; O'Harrow, Facial Recognition Sys-
tem Considered for U.S. Airports, supra note 30, at A14; see also Interest in
face scanning grows: Makers of technology struggle to meet demand since at-
tacks, REUTERS, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/630735.asp (Sept. 18, 2001)
('Right now what we need to do is build our defenses, as we need to protect
innocent lives and prevent this from happening again,' said Visionics CEO Jo-
seph Attick.").
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rent security procedures. 32
C. BORDER CONTROL
A third area of significant focus is the effort to improve the
tracking of non-U.S. citizens in the United States. It is clear
that many people in the United States who receive visas often
do not comply with the reporting requirements. 33 It is also clear
that current means to track those individuals are not particu-
larly effective.34 But it is less clear what role technology would
play in solving this problem. While it may be possible to inte-
grate databases to enable more detailed monitoring of indi-
viduals in the United States on visas, the idea of real-time
tracking, as has been proposed by some political leaders, would
require extraordinarily intrusive surveillance techniques and
also be extraordinarily expensive. It might also be fair to ask
whether U.S. citizens traveling abroad would accept a system
that would track their activities and their meetings with oth-
ers.
Some systems for real-time tracking of individuals are cur-
rently being pursued for parolees and those serving in-home
detention.3 5 These systems enable remote tracking of a person's
location and are designed to ensure that an individual stays
within a circumscribed geographic region. 6 Similar technolo-
gies widely available for pets administer a small shock to the
animal if the animal strays beyond the prescribed region.
We can briefly summarize this Part by noting that since
September 11 there has been a dramatic reduction in privacy in
the United States and that further proposals are under consid-
eration. Some of this may be ascribed to specific changes in
federal statutes; some to new technologies that enable greater
surveillance and tracking. The interesting question now is
whether we can say that there has been a similar decrease in
secrecy.
32. See Liz Anderson, At the Assembly-About Face, PROVIDENCE J., Jan.
17, 2002, at B1 (reporting that T.F. Green International Airport in Providence,
Rhode Island, one of the first airports to consider facial recognition technology,
decided in January 2002 that they would not install it after all, citing the pos-
sibility of false matches and other technological shortcomings of facial recogni-
tion systems).
33. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LUITS OF PRIVACY 107 (1999).
34. Id.
35. Jennifer Lee, Putting Parolees on a Tighter Leash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2002, at G1.
36. Id.
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III. EXPANSION IN GOVERNMENT SECRECY
There are two ways to understand the expansion of gov-
ernment authority resulting from passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001. One way is to assess the
variety of ways in which personal information may be made
more readily available to police in the course of a criminal or
national security investigation. This is apparent in the dimin-
ished probable cause standard in several key statutes. We can
reasonably say that these changes result in a diminished pri-
vacy protection for the person whose information is now more
readily available to government agents.
The second way to assess the means of expansion of gov-
emnment authority is the various ways in which the conduct of
government is more difficult to detect, is more readily con-
cealed, or fails to follow the requirements that might otherwise
apply. It is to this change-the increase in secrecy-that we
now turn.
Central to this analysis is the expanded role of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in the post USA PATRIOT
Act world. The FISA was originally enacted in 1978 to address
a problem raised in the Katz decision and left open by the en-
actment of the federal wiretap statute in 1968.38 That is what
would be the statutory standard for a search undertaken in
matters of national security. The Katz Court suggested that all
forms of electronic surveillance that violated a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy would be subject to a Fourth Amendment
standard. 9 But clearly there was concern that the standard ap-
propriate for the investigation of a person engaged in an illegal
gambling operation may not be the same as an agent of a for-
eign power, not a U.S. citizen, who intended harm against the
United States. 0
In 1978 Congress adopted the FISA with the narrow goal of
37. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.107-56, §§ 206, 216, 218, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1967) (White, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the Katz holding does not preclude a national security excep-
tion to the warrant requirement for wiretapping). But see id. at 359 (Douglas
and Brennan, JJ., concurring) (objecting to Justice White giving a "green light
for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a war-
rant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels 'national security' mat-
ters").
39. Id. at 359.
40. Id.
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enabling electronic surveillance of foreign agents in the United
States pursuant to federal statutory authority.41 The Act also
established the Foreign Intelligence Court, which, unlike a tra-
ditional Title III court, issued orders authorizing wiretaps
without indicating the jurisdiction, purpose, or duration of the
order.42 The FISA court met within the Department of Justice
office building in Washington, DC and was in physical orienta-
tion as well as statutory structure more closely aligned with the
interests of the executive branch of government than other
courts.
4 3
A. DIMINISHED ACCESS TO PUBLIc RECORDS
Not only has the prosecution of crime been made more se-
cretive since September 11, but so too have the routine activi-
ties of government. The Attorney General indicated in a memo
published on October 11 that federal agencies would be encour-
aged to withhold public records that are subject to the Freedom
of Information Act if there was a "reasonable basis" for the ap-
plication of a statutory exemption." This standard is in con-
trast to the one under which the federal agencies operated
when Janet Reno served as Attorney General. As President
Clinton's Attorney General, Reno had required that agencies
adopt a "foreseeable harm" test, similar to the standard that
Attorney General Levy had adopted in the 1970s.45
The new standard for litigating FOIA cases is a clear indi-
cation that the Department of Justice is less committed to open
government since September 11.46 On several occasions the At-
41. FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829, 1841-1846 (2002).
42. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518 with 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
43. See generally Patrick S. Poole, Inside America's Secret Court: The For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court, at http://fly.hiwaay.net/-pspoole/fiscshort.
html (last visited May 13, 2002).
44. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of all
Federal Departments and Agencies re: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct.
12, 2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft FOIA Memorandum], available at http'I/
www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm.
45. See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Heads of all
Federal Departments and Agencies re: The Freedom of Information Act 3 (Oct.
4, 1993), available at http'//www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia.updates/VolXUV_3/page3
.htm (urging agencies toward greater openness under FOIA, with an overall
"presumption of disclosure," establishing a new "foreseeable harm" standard
governing the application of FOIA exemptions, and promoting "discretionary"
FOIA disclosures as a means of achieving the goal of "maximum responsible
disclosure" under the Act).
46. See Tom Beierle & Ruth Greenspan Bell, Don't let 'right to know' be a
1124 [Vol.86:1115
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torney General has expressed his opinion that the U.S. federal
government cannot make information publicly available that
may be a threat to the country.47 This policy has extended to
decisions to severely limit the availably of public information
that was previously available over the Internet prior to Sep-
tember 11.
B. CLOSED HEARINGS
Government secrecy has also become apparent in the reluc-
tance of the President and the Congress to pursue public hear-
ings in what many have described as a "massive intelligence
failure."48 While CIA Director George Tenant appeared in an
open hearing to discuss the annual CIA budget request, subse-
quent hearings on the adequacy of intelligence gathering prior
to September 11, the current status of the Anthrax investiga-
tion, the justification for significantly expanding certain CIA
programs, as well as a range of questions related to the effec-
tiveness of the CIA have been kept from public review.
C. CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT SECRECY
One of the consequences of the expanded secrecy is clearly
that public accountability is diminished. This has conse-
quences both large and small. In the context of electronic sur-
veillance undertaken pursuant to the new powers created by
the USA PATRIOT Act, it means that targets of government
searches who might previously have been notified that they
were subject to government surveillance will not be so told.49 It
war casualty, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 2001, at 9; Editorial, On
the Public's Right to Know; The Day Ashcroft Censored Freedom of Informa-
tion, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 6, 2002, at D4; Editorial, Ashcroft sends a chilling
message FOIA: Memo urging caution over freedom of information requests
needs to be reviewed, VENTURA CTY. STAR, Jan. 11, 2002, at B6; Helen Tho-
mas, President Bush and John Ashcroft Trample the Bill of Rights, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 16, 2001, at B6.
47. See Ashcroft FOIA Memorandum, supra note 44; see also Testimony of
Attorney General John Ashcroft before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
(Dec. 6, 2001), available at http./www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/1206 tran-
scriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm.
48. E.g., CBS News: Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 16,
2001), available at http'//www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/17/flm/main311563
.shtml (Senator Shelby, ranking minority member of Senate Intelligence
Committee, referred to the terrorist attacks as "a massive intelligence fail-
ure.").
49. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. at 285-86
(amending the U.S. Code to allow for delayed notification of the execution of a
20021 1125
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means that public reporting of the use of surveillance authority
by federal investigators will be less detailed and less useful
than reports on similar activities in the past. And on large
open questions, like who was responsible for the dissemination
of deadly anthrax spores in the nation's capital in mid-October,
the government can continue to make representations about
the status of the case with little opportunity for the public to
probe the government's claims because information associated
with the investigation remains secret.50
IV. UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY AND SECRECY
What we have witnessed since September 11 is both the
diminishment of personal privacy and the expansion of gov-
ernment secrecy. Now this is a significant development that
bears some exploration however we may feel about the specific
steps taken in the wake of September 11. It is my aim at this
point to look more closely at the interplay of these two trends
and to see if the traditions in privacy law help us understand
the transformation taking place since September 11. Should it
surprise us that as personal privacy is diminished, government
secrecy expands?
We can begin with the observation of some commentators
that there is a tradeoff between privacy and transparency or
privacy and openness. According to this view privacy stands in
opposition to these values, and we may give up some privacy to
gain greater public accountability.
The communitarian scholar Amitai Etzioni, for example,
has argued that privacy must be balanced against competing
interests.51 Since September 11 Etzioni has endorsed a number
warrant).
50. Former CIA Director R. James Woolsey alleged in a Wall Street Jour-
nal editorial in mid-October that the use of "weapon-grade" made clear that
Saddam Hussein was responsible for the dissemination of anthrax in the na-
tion's capitol. R. James Woolsey, The Iraq Connection, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18,
2001, at http'/opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=95001338. Subse-
quent reporting by the Washington Post and other newspapers established
that the anthrax was almost certainly obtained from a U.S. lab. See also the
report of the Federation of American Scientists on the profile of the likely per-
petrator, a U.S.-trained scientist at http'//www.fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxre-
port.htm (last visited June 26, 2002). Rick Weiss & Susan Schmidt, Capitol
Hill Anthrax Matches Army's Stock: 5 Labs Can Trace Spores to Ft. Detrick,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at Al; Rick Weiss & Dan Eggen, US Says Anthrax
Germ in Mail is "Ames" Strain: Microbe is of Type Commonly Used in Re-
search, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at A8.
51. See generally ETZIONI, supra note 33.
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of proposals to expand surveillance, including adoption of a Na-
tional ID card and new airport screening procedures. 52 It is
Etzioni's view that these measures will promote public safety
and reduce the risk of future terrorist acts. 3
David Brin, author of The Transparent Society, argued in
similar fashion that privacy should give way to other social in-
terests, particularly the need for greater openness and trans-
parency that characterizes democratic society.54 Brin has also
argued since September 11 for greater tracking and monitoring
procedures.55
Corporate leaders such as Scott McNealy and Larry Ellison
have also argued that the interests of privacy must be traded
against the interests of openness and both have argued since
September 11 for the creation of a system of national identifica-
tion.: Ellison has specifically proposed that software and ser-
vices developed by his company could provide the basis for
greater information sharing across federal agencies.
7
In my view, none of these scholars, writers, or business
leaders properly understands the relationship between privacy
and secrecy. For privacy scholars and advocates, the relation-
ship between privacy and transparency is well understood. It
was expressed most famously, and a bit paradoxically, by the
European scholar and early architect of data protection laws
Jan Freese, who said, "We must protect privacy to enable the
free flow of information." 8 But whereas many have seen a
sharp contrast between the U.S. privacy and the European pri-
vacy tradition, the similarities are significant, particularly in
understanding the proper relationship between privacy and se-
crecy.
52. Amitai Etzioni, You'll love those national ID cards, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 14,2002, at 11.
53. See id.
54. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL
TECHNOLOGY MAKE US CHOOSE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND PRIVACY? (1998).
55. David Brin, Some Notes About Calamity and Opportunity, at http'/
www.futurist.com/911/notes..about_calamity.htm (last visited May 17, 2002).
56. See David Streitfeld & Charles Piller, Response to Terror, A Changed
America: Big Brother Finds Ally in Once-Wary High Tech, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2002, at Al; Larry Ellison, Digital Ids Can Help Prevent Terrorism, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 8, 2001, at A23, available at http://www.oracle.com/corporate/
index.html?digitalid.html.
57. See Ellison, supra note 56.
58. Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Transparency: The Paradox of Informa-
tion Policy , at http://www.rlg.org/annmtg/rotenbergO1.html (2001).
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I would like to turn now to the American tradition of seek-
ing to protect both privacy while limiting government secrecy.
It is my contention that this tradition, the one that sees privacy
and openness as complimentary values, is most at risk after
September 11. To make this point I will point to three critical
historical references: the opinions of Justice Brandeis, the post-
Watergate reforms of the U.S. Congress, and the establishment
of the OECD Privacy Guidelines in 1980.
To understand the complimentary nature of privacy and
openness, it is useful to look briefly of the legacy of the jurist
most responsible for the legal right of privacy in America. Louis
Brandeis is well known for the publication of the 1890 article
on The Right to Privacy,5 9 which became the basis for the
American privacy tort, and almost as well known for the 1928
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, in which he
described privacy as "the most comprehensive of rights."60 But
Brandeis is less well known, at least in many of the popular
debates on privacy, for his views on the First Amendment and
open government. It was Brandeis who said, "[s]unlight is said
to be the best of disinfectants .... -61 It was Brandeis who, to-
gether with Justice Holmes, wrote opinions that challenged the
World War I convictions for unpopular speech under the Sedi-
tion Act.62 In these opinions and others, Brandeis championed
a view of the world in which both a secure private sphere could
be protected in law and a robust public sphere of debate and
59. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REv. 193 (1890).
60. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61. LoUIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND How THE BANKERs
USE IT 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.").
62. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting and Brandeis, J., concurring in the dissent). Cf. Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., dissenting) ("The
constitutional right of free speech has been declared to be the same in peace
and in war."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
[The founding fathers] knew order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discour-
age thought, hope, and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones.
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democratic activity could be achieved.6 3
My second piece of historical evidence are the statutes en-
acted by Congress in the post-Watergate era that sought to pro-
tect the rights of citizens and to limit abuse by government,
particularly in the context of new information technologies. In
enacting both the Privacy Act of 19746 and adopting the
amendments that same year which significantly strengthened
the Freedom of Information Act, Congress sought to ensure
that personal information collected and maintained by federal
agencies would be properly protected while also seeking to en-
sure that public information in the possession of federal agen-
cies would be widely available to the public. 5 The complimen-
tary goals of safeguarding individual liberty and ensuring
government accountability were enabled by legislation that
protected privacy on the one hand and promoted government
oversight on the other. To this day, the twin goals of limiting
disclosure of personal information held by government agencies
and enabling access to public information has been followed by
nations around the world.66
Finally, let us consider the OECD Privacy Guidelines of
1980,6' considered by many the most widely adopted articula-
tion of privacy rights in the world.' The OECD Guidelines
clearly impose restrictions on the collection and use of personal
information.69 Indeed, one of the critical contrasts between the
OECD Guidelines and other less robust means for privacy pro-
63. See generally PHILIPPA STRUII, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSmSM
(1993); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIs D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
(1984); cf Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 263 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, given the vast public interest in
news stories, such information should not be copyrightable, because to do so
would "effect an important extension of property rights and a corresponding
curtailment of the free use of knowledge and of ideas.").
64. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), reprinted and discussed
in MARC ROTENBERG, PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 2001 at 39 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter PRIvACY LAW SOURCEBOOK].
65. See PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 39, 60.
66. See, e.g., Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 165 (1993) (Can.).
67. See OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data (1980) [hereinafter OECD Privacy Guidelines], re-
printed in PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 268-96.
68. See, e.g., David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy
Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveil-
lance Laws and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 11
(1999).
69. See OECD Privacy Guidelines, supra note 67.
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tection, such as the FTC articulation of Fair Information Prac-
tices, is the failure to specifically include such concepts as "use
limitation," "collection limitation," "disclosure limitation," or
"secondary purposes."70
But it is equally clear that the other metric by which pri-
vacy policies often fail to match the standards set out by the
OECD Guidelines is the absence of a corresponding require-
ments for transparency. The OECD Privacy Guidelines make
clear that for privacy protection to be effective, transparency
and access concerns are paramount.71 In many respects the
OECD Guidelines mirror the goal set out in the 1973 report
that gave way to the adoption of the Privacy Act in 1974, and
that was to ensure that there were no secret databases in gov-
ernment tracking the lawful activities of citizens.72
In outlining this argument that privacy and openness are
complimentary values, I do not intend to deny that there are
hard cases that may place these interests in conflict.73 This was
clear in the Court's consideration of Bartnicki v. Vopper last
term, in which the Court held that the First Amendment pre-
cluded liability under the federal wiretap statute for publica-
tion of information obtained by means of illegal wiretap where
the publisher was not the person who had committed the
unlawful interception. 74 Although it is fair to note that there
are competing free speech values for the participants in a con-
versation who wish to make use of new technology to exchange
information that might not otherwise be disclosed absent the
statutory protection, for those who wish to publish the contents
70. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information
Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Report to Congress (May 2000),
available at http'/www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2OO0/privacy2OOO.pdf. See also
Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and
Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1393, 1461 (2001); Paul Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet
Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 743, 781-86 (2000).
71. "The right of individuals to access and challenge personal data is gen-
erally regarded as perhaps the most important privacy protection safeguard."
PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 290 (citing OECD Privacy
Guidelines).
72. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
73. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), which held a rape shield stat-
ute unconstitutional, is clearly one such case.
74. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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of the conversation, their right to publish conflicts directly with
the privacy interests of the parties to the conversation.
There are similar clashes over access to court records in
electronic form and the publication of private matters by the
press. 75 Even EPIC faced the difficult question of whether to
proceed with a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the
Department of Justice to determine the status of those who
were detained after September 11.76 Clearly that case illumi-
nates the concern that the disclosure of a person's detention
could be stigmatizing and could create actual harm as to future
employment and economic opportunity for the individuals
whose status was disclosed. But it was also out of recognition
that the privacy interests of the detainees could not become a
proxy for the desire of government to maintain secrecy sur-
rounding these possibly unlawful detentions that we at EPIC
decided to go forward. It was and is our view that mechanisms
could be created to enable disclosure of detainees' status that
would minimize the privacy risk while maximizing the likeli-
hood that some light would be shed as to the government's con-
duct.77
More broadly, we might say about modern privacy law that
the aim is to enable both personal privacy and government ac-
countability in the use of new technology by limiting the collec-
tion and use of personal information where possible and by im-
posing disclosure and reporting requirements where such
collection occurs. Privacy law has made clear the particular
importance of this goal in the area of new technologies where
systems of surveillance dramatically amplify state authority.78
75. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514; Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524; Doe v. Otte,
259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, Otte v. Doe, 70 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S.
Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01-729). Similar issues have arisen with public access to
court records. See generally EPIC's Public Records Page at http'I/
www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/.
76. See EPIC, CNS v. DOJ, at httpj/www.epic.org/open-gov/foia/cnss_v_
doj.html.
77. For example, in EPIC's 1993 litigation seeking the release under
FOIA of Secret Service records pertaining to the search and seizure of 2600
employees, EPIC obtained signed statements from targets of investigation to
go forward with the FOIA request for relevant records held by the Secret Ser-
vice. See EPIC, 2600Archive, at httpJ/www.epic.org/security/hackers/2600/.
78. So much is made clear in the Congressional findings and statement of
purpose for the Privacy Act of 1974:
(a) The Congress finds that-
(1) the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by Fed-
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But these hard cases typically arise where there is a spe-
cific matter in dispute, a specific claim before a court. They
rarely speak prospectively, as statutes do, to the ordering of
privacy claims and publication requirements. And most signifi-
cantly, the disputes outlined above do not require the simulta-
neous diminishment of personal privacy and expansion of gov-
ernment secrecy.
Privacy is, as Professor Raymond Shih Ray Ku suggests in
his article, about power.79 And privacy law is established to rec-
eral angencies;
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information
technology, while essential to the efficient operations of the Govern-
ment, has greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can
occur from any collection, maintenance, use or dissemination of per-
sonal information;
(3) the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insur-
ance, and credit, and his right to due process, and other legal protec-
tions are endangered by the misuse of certain information systems;
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected
by the Constitution of the United States; and
(5) in order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in informa-
tion systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and
proper for the Congress to regulate the collection, maintenance, use,
and dissemination of information by such agencies.
(b) The purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an in-
dividual against an invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal
agencies, except as otherwise provided by law, to-
(1) permit an individual to determine what records pertaining to him
are collected, maintained, used, or disseminated by such agencies;
(2) permit an individual to prevent records pertaining to him obtained
by such agencies for a particular urpose from being used or made
available for another purpose without his consent;
(3) permit an individual to gain access to information pertaining to
him in Federal agency records, to have a copy made of all or any por-
tion thereof, and to correct or amend such records;
(4) collect, maintain, use , or disseminate any record of identifiable
personal information in a manner that assures that such action is for
a necessary and lawful purpose, that the information is current and
accurate for its intended use, and that adequate safeguards are pro-
vided to prevent misuse of such information;
(5) permit exemptions from the requirements with respect to records
provided in this Act only in those cases where there is an important
public policy need for such exemption as has been determined by spe-
cific statutory authority; and
(6) be subject to civil suit for any damages which occur as a result of
willful or intentional action which violates any individual's rights un-
der this Act.
PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 40-41.
79. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amend-
ment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325,
1326 (2002).
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tify asymmetries in power and to protect the rights of individu-
als against institutions that are able to delve deeply into our
private lives. Viewed in this light, the developments since Sep-
tember 11 should be seen as an expansion of state power and a
consequential limitation on the freedom of individuals. The
balance between the authority of the state and the rights of the
individual has shifted. There has been no beneficial tradeoff
between privacy and openness, as Etzioni, Brin, or Ellison have
suggested."' There has simply been greater exposure of private
life and greater secrecy surrounding the actions of government.
WHAT ARE WE TO DO?
It might be tempting at this point to stop and congratulate
ourselves for this important insight about the relationship be-
tween privacy and secrecy and the underlying purpose of pri-
vacy protection in law. Much of legal study is indeed the care-
ful consideration of doctrine, an examination of key concepts,
decisions, and statutes. But I would argue today that after
September 11 we have a greater obligation than just the pro-
duction of a descriptive model that is intellectually satisfying.
As law students, teachers, and advocates, we should build
on our legal tradition, on our Constitutional democracy, and
participate in the public debates that affect us not simply as
experts in the field but also as citizens who will live with the
consequences of action taken or not taken by the government
that we have created. We should understand that in the battle
to protect privacy lies also the struggle to maintain Constitu-
tional democracy, to safeguard the rights of citizens, and to
hold government accountable. Privacy remains today as fun-
damental a measure of democratic society as it was when
democracy when born.81
80. See supra notes 52, 55, 56 and accompanying text.
81.
[J]ust as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in
our relations with each other. We do not get into a state with our
next-door neighbour if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we
give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm,
still do hurt people's feelings. We are free and tolerant in our private
lives ....
THUCYDIDEs, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 145 (Penguin Books
1972) (431 B.C.E.) (quoting Pericles' Funeral Oration before the Athenians);
see also DONALD KAGAN, PERICLES OF ATHENS AND THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY
146-47 (1991) (In Pericles' speech to the Athenians he compares the absence of
any privacy in Sparta to the Athenian regime, which "leaves considerable
space for individualism and privacy, free from public scrutiny.").
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If there are to be proposals to establish new systems of
public surveillance, then the legal community has an obligation
to assess these developments and to determine their impact on
current law and the rights of citizens.8 2
In going forward with this effort, I would like to make
three points. First, we should understand that the balance to
be achieved here is not the one too often stated as between se-
curity and freedom. Benjamin Franklin rightly cautioned that
those who would sacrifice "essential liberty for temporary secu-
rity" will have neither liberty nor security.83 The balance that
must be achieved is between the authority created for govern-
ment and the means of oversight to ensure that these new pow-
ers are not misused. This tradition is well established in law
and it remains critical that every proposal put forward by Con-
gress after September 11 explains how new state authority will
be balanced by new means of oversight.
Second, we must avoid the risk of allowing the descriptive
to collapse into the normative. By this I mean that we should
not simply restate the observation that during times of national
crisis, the authority of the government is necessarily expanded
and the rights of the citizens are necessarily diminished. It is
descriptively correct to say that Japanese Americans were in-
terned during World War II. It is also normatively fair to say
that the internment was wrong and should not have occurred.
Those who cite the internment of the Japanese during the Sec-
ond World War, the prosecution of pacifists during the First
World War, and arguably even the suspension of habeas corpus
during the Civil War in support of new restrictions on the
rights of citizens should not go unchallenged. Many injustices
occur in times of crisis, and the fact of prior injustice should not
justify the commission of new injustice.
82. For example, the American Bar Association created a new committee,
the Cyberspace Committee Task Force, to examine the legal issues surround-
ing electronic surveillance, security, and privacy in the wake of September 11.
The task force was developed to formulate guidelines in the face of "[t]he new
frontier forged by the intersection of data protection, electronic communica-
tions and Cybercrimes, including CyberTerrorism, [which raise] novel busi-
ness problems, particularly in light of new laws and standards related to the
privacy of customer information." See Press Release, New ABA Cyberspace
Committee Task Force to Examine Legal Issues Surrounding Electronic Secu-
rity & Privacy (Jan. 30, 2002) (on file with author). In particular, the Task
Force "will work to identify and interpret the ramifications of new laws, such
as the anti-terrorism USA Patriot Act of 2001." Id.
83. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS 141 (An-
thony Jay ed., 1996).
1134 [Vol.86:1115
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Most critically, we must oppose the fatalism that has cap-
tured the minds and hearts of too many Americans. We should
reject the premise that after September 11 we can no longer af-
ford the privacy or freedom that we previously enjoyed.84 The
United States has survived world war, presidential assassina-
tion, domestic riots, and economic depression. We have had
nuclear weapons targeted on the nation's capital by foreign ad-
versaries for much of the twentieth century. But none of these
developments has required a permanent sacrifice in the struc-
ture of liberty established by the Constitution or by law, or,
specifically, a sacrifice of the individual's freedom to limit the
oversight of government. To allow crisis, even of the magnitude
of September 11, to necessarily diminish the rights of citizens
or the responsibility of government is a path without end.
And that remains our challenge today, after the events of
September 11, and that remains the special obligation of the
legal profession and legal educators. Alexis de Tocqueville told
us that in the American form of government, lawyers come for-
ward when there are great challenges.8 We are at a similar
point in history. We have a duty to safeguard privacy, to op-
pose secrecy, and to ensure the protection of constitutional
freedom.
84. See, e.g., Judy Mann, It's a Changed World, and We Will Adapt to It,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2001, at C12; Robin Toner, Some Foresee a Sea Change in
Attitudes on Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at http'J/
www.nytines.com/2001/09/15/national/1SCI.html.
85. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AIERICA 290 (Random
House 1945) (1835).
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